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CASE NOTES
est within the provisions of section 9-307(2). In counselling the secured
party, one must assess the risk of being defeated by such a purchaser, against
the economics and efficiency inherent in perfection without filing. In balanc-
ing the equities between the two innocent parties one must ask how much
risk must the secured party assume in order to enjoy the convenience of
automatic perfection. With regard to automatic perfection, the UCC has
imposed a maximum limit of $2,500 on the purchase of farm equipment and
thirteen states have limited this further.23 Three states have imposed a
maximum dollar limitation on consumer goods, 24 and four states have deleted
the provisions of section 9-307(2) entirely. 25 These statistics exhibit the
tendency of the legislatures to lessen the risk assumed by the secured party as
the price for automatic perfection.
The Shawmut case intended to minimize the risk of the secured party being
defeated by execution purchasers generally. From the foregoing analysis, it
is quite apparent that there is no sound basis for excluding stranger pur-
chasers from the protection of section 9-307(2). The defendant execution
purchaser was a judgment creditor and not a stranger, therefore the reasoning
of the Shawmut court is mere dictum with regard to stranger purchasers. It
is the writer's hope that such reasoning ultimately remain dictum and that
courts in the future will distinguish between these classes of purchasers, and
allow stranger purchasers the protection of section 9-307(2).
Paul Episcope
23 UCC REP,. SERV. (State Correlation, 1967): Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin.
24 UCC REP. SERV. (State Correlation, 1967): Colorado, Maryland, Rhode Island
(Maine deleted consumer goods generally).
25 UCC Rap. SRV. (State Correlation, 1967): California, Kansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee.
WRONGFUL DEATH-SURVIVAL OF ACTION AFTER
DEATH OF SOLE BENEFICIARY
James McDaniel with his wife and daughter died as a result of injuries
sustained in a four car collision. A wrongful death action was begun on
behalf of Yvonne McDaniel, the infant next of kin of the decedents, seek-
ing damages for their death allegedly caused by the negligent acts of the
defendants. Some nine and one-half months after the accident, and while the
suit was pending in her behalf as sole beneficiary, Yvonne died from causes
unrelated thereto. The trial court granted the defendants' motion dismissing
the action on the grounds that the wrongful death action abated upon the
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death of the sole beneficiary. The°Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and
allowed the beneficiary who later died of an unrelated cause to recover for
loss of support. McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
Although the Illinois legislature has passed various survival and wrongful
death statutes, and although the Illinois courts have had to consider other
similar cases, there is little established law relating to the question presented
in the McDaniel case. The issue here is whether a pending action under the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act abates upon the death, from completely unre-
lated causes, of the sole beneficiary of such action. The purpose of this note
is to examine this issue in view of statutory and case law and to determine
the trends concerning this issue in various other jurisdictions.
Under early common law, there was no civil remedy for the killing of
one human being by another, for as it has been often stated, a personal
action for damages died with the person.' In fact "it was more profitable
for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him."'2 To correct this
wrong, Lord Campbell's Act was passed in England in 1846 which for the
first time permitted a wrongful death action to be brought for the benefit
of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death was
caused by the wrongful or negligent act of the defendant. 3 Since then, the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States have adopted in their own
statutes the essence and meaning of Lord Campbell's Act, and therefore,
in the majority of jurisdictions, wrongful death actions are maintainable for
the benefit of those who suffer damages through the wrongful death of their
next of kin.
4
Illinois has enacted an extensive Wrongful Death Act 5 which has been
1 Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 239 (1929).
2 PROSSER, TORTS, § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
8 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
4 E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 956 (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2921-22 (1962); VA.
W. D. STAT. §§ 8-633 to -634 (1957).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1965): "1. Whenever the death of a person shall be
caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who
or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person in-
jured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to felony. 2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the names
of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and, except as otherwise herein-
after provided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person and in every such action
the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with
reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the wife and next of
kin of such deceased person .
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extended to cover causes of action6 in addition to those which survived at
common law. In addition to this, the Constitution of the State of Illinois
provides that "every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for
all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or
reputation. .... ".
Wrongful death actions are maintainable for the benefit of a class of bene-
ficiaries designated by statute. The defense in the McDaniel case bases its
contentions on the law expounded in 1928 in Illinois in the case of Wilcox v.
Bierd,8 in which the decedent was survived by his infant daughter by only
thirty minutes. The court in that case stated that as a wrongful death action
is purely statutory and is not an action for injuries to the person, to personal
property or to real estate, the action does not survive but abates upon the
death of the party for whose benefit it is brought. 9
Another closely related and important case, decided in Ohio in 1954, is
Danis v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. 10 There the sister of the decedent, and the only
statutory beneficiary in the wrongful death action, died during the pendency
of the case before the court. The court held that an action for wrongful
death may not be maintained where, during the pendency thereof, the only
heir and next of kin of the decedent who sustained pecuniary injury by
reason of the death dies, since no one remains within the purview of the
death statute in whose behalf the action may be further prosecuted.'1 The
court continued by stating that the maintainance of the action was precluded
by the statute creating the right of action for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's surviving spouse, children and other next of kin who suffer pecuni-
ary injury from the death.12
The determining factor involved in the survival of a wrongful death action
to the estate of the deceased beneficiary is whether such action is an action
to recover damages to personal property as allowed by Illinois statute.13 Since
1928, under the guiding principles of Wilcox v. Bierd,1 4 a survival action has
6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1965): "In addition to the actions which survived by
the common law, the following also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover
damages for an injury to the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover
damages for an injury to real or personal property ... .
7 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19.
8 Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
9 Id. at 586, 162 N.E. at 176.
'ODanis v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 160 Ohio St. 474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954).
11 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1286 (1955).
12Supra note 10, at 476, 117 N.E.2d at 40.
Is ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1965).
14 Supra note 8.
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been allowed only to recover damages to tangible property, i.e. physical
property that can be seen, handled or moved. 15 As was stated in the Wilcox
case:
It is not a suit to recover damages to personal property or to real estate within
the meaning of the survival act, but is a suit to recover for a loss of the increase
in money value to the estate of the deceased, which the deceased would in all
probability have made had he lived, for the benefit and use of his widow and
next of kin. It may be said to be a suit for recovery of damage or loss to a
property right in its most general sense, but it is not a suit to recover loss to
personal or real property and is not assignable under the previous holdings of
this court.' 6
Many other jurisdictions have continued to follow the traditional view of
the Wilcox case. In 1956 in the case of Deeg v. City of Detroit,17 where a
suit was brought for damages for causing a post-mortem examination of the
plaintiff's husband without her consent, and during the pendency of such
suit the plaintiff died, the Michigan court held that the cause of action did
not survive the plaintiff's death. The court went on to say:
It ceased to exist at that time and, in consequence, was not subject to being
revived and prosecuted by the administrator of her estate. The right that the
defendant was charged with having violated was purely personal in character. It
did not involve an injury to person or to property within the meaning of the
provisions of the statute . . . relating to the survival of rights of action, and
it was not of such character as to survive at common law.'8
A similar result was reached in 1939 in Louisiana in the case of Hardtner v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.' 9 where the widow of the decedent died after com-
mencing a wrongful death action for the death of her husband. The court
here held that the action for damages could not be continued by her heirs
since the recovery of damages for the husband's death was personal, did
not survive her death, and was not capable of being transmitted to her heirs.20
Although Wilcox represents the traditional view, there is emerging in the
law in many jurisdictions a contrary theory to the effect that the action
does not abate upon the death of the sole beneficiary. Such was the holding
of the court in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co.21 wherein the court stated:
15 Shedd v. Patterson, 312 Ill. 371, 144 N.E. 5 (1924).
16 Supra note 8, at 586, 162 N.E. at 176.
17345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W.2d 16 (1956).
18 Id. at 379, 76 N.W.2d at 20.
9 189 So. 365 (La. 1939).
20 Id. See Cummins v. Kansas City Public Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672 (1933); Walsh v.
Bressette, 51 R.I. 354, 155 A. 1 (1931); Rogers v. Ft. Worth & D.C.R.R., 91 S.W.2d
458 (Tex. 1936).
21300 U.S. 342 (1937).
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When we remember that under the death statutes an independent cause of action
is created in favor of the beneficiaries for their pecuniary damages, the conclusion
is not difficult that the cause of action once accrued is not divested or extinguished
by the death of one or more of the beneficiaries thereafter, but survives, like a
cause of action for injury to a property right or interest, to the extent that the
estate of the deceased beneficiary is proved to be impaired. 22
Along with this view, the courts in the more modern holdings have stated
that the wrongful death and survival statutes, such as have been enacted in
Illinois, are to be liberally construed.2 3 Indeed, the McDaniel case follows
this trend in the law by moving away from the strict holding in Wilcox
towards a more liberal view stating that the action does not abate. Therefore,
there is no reason why an estate that has been injured or depleted by the
wrong of another should not be compensated, whether the injured party is
living or not. A similar holding was reached in 1962 in California in the case
of Johnson v. Key Sys. Transit Lines24 where the mother, as sole heir of
their decedent, filed a wrongful death action for her son's death as a result
of a collision between her son's car and the defendant's train. The court in
that case held that the cause of action for wrongful death necessarily resulted
from physical injury to the decedent in his life time, and therefore, under
the statute, the cause of action survives the death of the plaintiff and vests
itself in her heir, the person who owns the cause of action. 25 A similar result
was reached in Virginia in 1957 in the case of Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer
Co. 26 where plaintiff's decedent, an infant, was killed when the automobile
in which he was riding with his parents collided with defendant's truck. His
father died in the accident and his mother survived for only a few hours.
The defendant moved for a dismissal of the action on the theory that
since the mother was the sole beneficiary of the infant, that any right of
action abated upon her death. The court in that case stated that:
[T]he statute is remedial and should be liberally construed so as to accomplish
its object . . . [and therefore] we think it would be too narrow a construction
of the statute to hold that an action thereunder could abate as long as any bene-
ficiary person or class named in the statute existed.27
Here the beneficiary under the statute was the estate of the decedent. In
2 2 Id. at 348.
23 Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N.E. 553 (1898); Devine v. Healy,
241 Ill. 34, 89 N.E. 251 (1909).
24 210 Cal. App. 2d 440, 26 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1962).
25 Id. at 440; 26 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
26 199 Va. 63, 97 S.E.2d 723 (1957).
27 Id. at 67, 97 S.E.2d at 726 (1957).
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addition to the above cases, there are many other jurisdictions which follow
the theory expounded in the McDaniel case. 28
One additional factor must be considered to determine the effectiveness
of the McDaniel decision. After that decision was rendered in July, 1966,
the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with a similar situation in the case
of Butterman v. Chamales.2 9 The appellate court rendered its decision in
that case seemingly in disregard or without knowledge of the McDaniel deci-
sion. In holding that an action for an attorney's negligence cannot be
maintained against the attorney's estate upon the death of the attorney,
the court regressed to the older Illinois view by holding that an action to
recover damages for an injury to personal property within the meaning of
the Illinois statutes applies only to actions for damages to tangible articles
and things moveable.30 This decision seems to indicate the appellate court's
unwillingness to give the Illinois statutes the liberal interpretation required
by the McDaniel case.
The decision in McDaniel v. Bullard places Illinois among those many
jurisdictions giving a more liberal interpretation to the strict common law
rules relating to wrongful death actions. This truly is consistent with the
modern procedural trends allowing a case between a wronged plaintiff and a
wrongful defendant to be decided on the merits rather than on a legal and
sometimes blind technicality. Despite the Butterman decision, McDaniel is
the law in Illinois today, and as it is consistent with the law in the majority
of jurisdictions in the United States, its effect will give a much needed remedy
to a very serious wrong.
Dennis Buyer
28 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Jackson, 77 Ga. App. 341, 48 S.E.2d 691 (1948) ; Wabash
R.R. v. Gretzinger, 182 Ind. 155, 104 N.E. 69 (1914); Keele v. Atchison T. & S.F. R.R.,
151 Mo. App. 364, 131 S.W. 730 (1910); Thomas v. Maysville Gas Co., 112 Ky. 569,
66 S.W. 398 (1902); Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393
(1939); Cibulla v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 25 N.J. Misc. 98, 50 A.2d 461
(1946); Frampton v. Santa Fe N.W. R.R., 34 N.M. 660, 287 P. 694 (1930); Mella v.
Northern S.S. Co., 127 F. 416 (1903) ; Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724
(1913) ; Milyak v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co., 300 Pa. 457, 150 A. 622 (1930);
Lones v. McFall, 152 Tenn. 239, 276 S.W. 866 (1925).
29 73 Ill. App. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 81 (1966).
30 Id.
